{"query": "Strategy - competition and cooperation", "count": 20, "results": [{"id": "card_logistics_strategy", "title": "Strategy - competition and cooperation", "shelf": "codex", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Supply chains are strategic: competitors, suppliers and shocks. Game theory governs the equilibria.", "authority_tier": "engine_derived", "source": "Narrow Highway — logistics", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_theory_symbiosis", "title": "Symbiosis & endosymbiosis (cooperation as a major transition)", "shelf": "theories", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Symbiosis & endosymbiosis (cooperation as a major transition) — an engine domain that can touch it: biology. Calibration: map-only — historical and empirical. Different species living together, from m", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Theory Assay — calibrated, not judged (docs/THEORY_CATALOG.md)", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_theory_evolutionary_game_theory__evolutionarily_stable_stra", "title": "Evolutionary game theory (evolutionarily stable strategies)", "shelf": "theories", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Evolutionary game theory (evolutionarily stable strategies) — an engine domain that can touch it: biology. Calibration: map-only — stability conditions compute; the biology is empirical. Maynard Smith", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Theory Assay — calibrated, not judged (docs/THEORY_CATALOG.md)", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_theory_game_theory", "title": "Game theory (Nash equilibrium)", "shelf": "theories", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Game theory (Nash equilibrium) — an engine domain that can touch it: operations_research. Calibration: seals — equilibria of finite games compute. A situation where no player can do better by unilater", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Theory Assay — calibrated, not judged (docs/THEORY_CATALOG.md)", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_playbook_the_game", "title": "The Game — opening, midgame, closing; two gates, green and red", "shelf": "playbook", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "The Prisoner's Dilemma: there are many and no true opponents. It isn't two-sided. Multifaceted, but also it can expand and contract. Opening, midgame and closing. Opening is the optimal path. Midgame ", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Fractal Playbook (Final) — Lighthouse/lw/08_docs/foundations/01_fractal_playbook.md", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_floor_game_theory", "title": "Game theory — equilibrium, dilemmas, and strategy", "shelf": "codex", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "The mathematics of strategic choice. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point where no one gains by deviating alone; the prisoner's dilemma shows rational players reaching a worse outcome than cooperation;", "authority_tier": "engine_derived", "source": "Narrow Highway — game theory", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_tool_interlibrary_loan_ill", "title": "Interlibrary Loan (ILL) — free find", "shelf": "access", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Interlibrary Loan (ILL): Ask your library to borrow a book or article from another library for you — usually free. Almost anything can be gotten this way.  How it's free & legal: library cooperation. ", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "Interlibrary Loan (ILL)", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_game_evolutionary", "title": "Evolutionary games — fitness is the payoff", "shelf": "codex", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Replace rational choice with reproduction and the same math governs biology: an evolutionarily stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium no mutant can invade (hawk-dove, the evolution of cooperation). Res", "authority_tier": "engine_derived", "source": "Narrow Highway — game theory", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_seal_fa165188a146194e021d61ea96cec7a0aecd7bba0935623c383fee5dfee934df", "title": "Receipt fa165188a146… — sealed: record", "shelf": "seals", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "{\n \"anchors\": [],\n \"axis_coords\": {\n  \"axis\": \"mathematics\",\n  \"dimensions\": [\n   \"reasoning\"\n  ]\n },\n \"gate_results\": [\n  {\n   \"details\": {\n    \"broken_at\": null,\n    \"confirmed_steps\": 1,\n    \"error", "authority_tier": "engine_derived", "source": "Narrow Highway engine — sealed record", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_game_prisoners_dilemma", "title": "The prisoner's dilemma — the price of rationality", "shelf": "codex", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Each player does better to defect whatever the other does, so both defect (1 each) though cooperation would give 3 each (gap sealed as 2). The Nash outcome is not the best: self-interest reaches a wor", "authority_tier": "engine_derived", "source": "Narrow Highway — game theory", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_src_pron_cooperations", "title": "cooperations", "shelf": "pronunciation", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "cooperations: pronounced (ARPABET) K OW0 AA2 P ER0 EY1 SH AH0 N Z; also K W AA2 P ER0 EY1 SH AH0 N Z. From the CMU Pronouncing Dictionary — the standard machine-readable pronunciations of North Americ", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "CMU Pronouncing Dictionary (cmudict) — BSD-2-Clause, Carnegie Mellon", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_src_etym_cooperation", "title": "cooperation", "shelf": "etymology", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "cooperation: etymology (Webster 1913) — n.: [L. coöperatio: cf. F. coopération.]. From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913), public domain.", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913), Project Gutenberg eBook #29765 — public domain", "readable": true, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_src_pron_cooperation", "title": "cooperation", "shelf": "pronunciation", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "cooperation: pronounced (ARPABET) K OW0 AA2 P ER0 EY1 SH AH0 N; also K W AA2 P ER0 EY1 SH AH0 N, K W AO2 P ER0 EY1 SH AH0 N. From the CMU Pronouncing Dictionary — the standard machine-readable pronunc", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "CMU Pronouncing Dictionary (cmudict) — BSD-2-Clause, Carnegie Mellon", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_src_fed_cat31316442", "title": "Agricultural cooperation in Denmark and Sweden", "shelf": "agriculture", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Agricultural cooperation in Denmark and Sweden. A United States federal publication, public domain (17 USC 105). The full text (113,702 bytes) is held on the ark; waybill sha256 00fdf1c0f3cb2d49…; ori", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "USDA publications (PD, 17 USC 105)", "readable": true, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_case_reciprocity__politics___trust__but_verify____the_inf_treaty", "title": "'Trust, but verify' — the INF Treaty (1987)", "shelf": "strategy", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "'Trust, but verify' — the INF Treaty, 1987 — reciprocal elimination of a whole missile class with on-site verification, each side's step answered by the other's. Evidence: 2,692 missiles destroyed by ", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Strategy Concordance — patterns of what endures", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_case_reciprocity__business__reputation_among_strangers___ebay_feedba", "title": "Reputation among strangers — eBay feedback (1996–)", "shelf": "strategy", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Reputation among strangers — eBay feedback, 1996– — a public running score turned one-shot trades between strangers into a repeated game. Evidence: sellers with a record of cooperation commanded a pri", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Strategy Concordance — patterns of what endures", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_case_reciprocity__science__axelrod_s_tournaments", "title": "Axelrod's tournaments (1979–1980)", "shelf": "strategy", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Axelrod's tournaments, 1979–1980 — the simplest entry, TIT FOR TAT (cooperate, then copy the other's last move), won both open computer tournaments against more cunning strategies. Evidence: Axelrod, ", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Strategy Concordance — patterns of what endures", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_pattern_reciprocity", "title": "Reciprocity — cooperate first, answer in kind, forgive, be clear", "shelf": "strategy", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "In a repeated game the winning move is tit-for-tat: open with cooperation, return what you receive, forgive a single defection, and be predictable — so the other side's best reply is to cooperate too.", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Strategy Concordance — patterns of what endures", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_case_reciprocity__war__live_and_let_live_in_the_trenches", "title": "Live-and-let-live in the trenches (1914–1917)", "shelf": "strategy", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "Live-and-let-live in the trenches, 1914–1917 — front-line units on both sides tacitly refrained from lethal fire at mealtimes and routines, answering restraint with restraint and a breach with a sharp", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Strategy Concordance — patterns of what endures", "readable": false, "generated": false}, {"id": "card_counter_reciprocity__business__the_last_round___enron_s_counterparties", "title": "The last round — Enron's counterparties (2001) — where it failed", "shelf": "strategy", "surface": "secular", "snippet": "The last round — Enron's counterparties, 2001 — trading partners who had cooperated for years defected the week the future vanished. What failed, and why: when the game is known to end, backward induc", "authority_tier": "reference", "source": "The Strategy Concordance — patterns of what endures", "readable": false, "generated": false}], "house": {"door": "FIND", "kind": "cards", "trail": "results", "seal": null, "next_step": {"do": "open the top card", "door": "FIND", "tool": "card_get", "params": {"id": "card_logistics_strategy"}}, "ends": "a verdict or a card · the trail · a seal · one next step"}}